UK Right of Reply on behalf of AUKUS partners, IAEA November 2026

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Chair,

I take the floor on behalf of the AUKUS partners, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, to reject baseless claims about Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS. Australia’s sovereign decision to acquire this capability is fully consistent with the letter and spirit of the NPT and the IAEA safeguards framework. 

AUKUS partners remain committed to transparency and will continue to engage openly. We continue to welcome the Board’s discussion of naval nuclear propulsion under apolitical items proposed by the Director General when he judges appropriate and as informed by his reports to the Board. Such discussions, like those held earlier this session, serve to uphold the Agency’s independent, impartial, and technical role in safeguards implementation, which is something we should all strive to protect.

Unfortunately, politically motivated agenda items such as this one do the opposite.

This item’s inclusion has never commanded consensus, adds unnecessary time and cost to the Board’s operations, and undermines the Director General’s independent technical mandate. We continue to question the item’s utility, particularly when our session is already condensed to three days, and when we already discussed this topic earlier in the week under the Director General’s agenda item. Nothing has been said here today that could not have been said yesterday. The fact we must now waste valuable time – purely for the sake of politics – is extremely disappointing.

Chair,

It is with regret that, rather than address genuine challenges, some have chosen to use the Board’s limited time to repeat their unfounded arguments and mischaracterisations.

Some interventions delivered today distort reality by making unsubstantiated claims about AUKUS activities and falsely imply a compliance issue where none exists, ignoring information provided in good faith and contradicting the Director General’s statements.  The push for ‘an inter-governmental process’ attempts to directly interfere in the bilateral, in-confidence engagement of a Member State with the IAEA on safeguards implementation.

It is for this reason that we must take the floor on this item at every Board to challenge such interference and call it out for what it is.

Chair, the facts are clear:

  • AUKUS partners are fully complying with their respective international obligations, including under the NPT, the Treaty of Rarotonga and its protocols, and Australia’s IAEA safeguards agreements.

  • The IAEA Statute authorises the Agency to negotiate safeguards and verification arrangements directly and confidentially with Member States. Political interference would weaken its independence and technical authority and should concern us all.

  • Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT. Article 14 of the IAEA’s model CSA – on which Australia’s CSA is based – is the specific provision enabling States Parties to use nuclear material in naval nuclear propulsion, within the safeguards legal framework.

  • The NPT permits the transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level provided the transfer is not for nuclear weapons and is carried out in a manner consistent with any relevant safeguards obligations. Transfers of fuel components do take place between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states, and the safe and secure transport of nuclear fuel takes place regularly around the world. Australia’s programme will be subject to a robust package of safeguards and verification measures, consistent with its longstanding non-proliferation obligations.

  • UK and US submarine visits to Australia, and their rotational presence through Submarine Rotational Force-West (SRF-West) from late 2027, are central to preparing Australia to operate, maintain and steward nuclear-powered submarines. Direct experience alongside AUKUS partners is the most effective way to build this capability. Any Member State interested in the safe and secure operation of submarines should welcome this.

  • SRF-West is fully consistent with Australia’s longstanding policy: submarines will rotate through HMAS Stirling in Western Australia, not be permanently based there. AUKUS activities associated with SRF-West will be conducted consistent with each partners’ respective international obligations, including those under the NPT, and Australia’s obligations under the Treaty of Rarotonga.

Chair, colleagues,

In conclusion, we thank you for your patience. These are clarifications the AUKUS partners have made before, and I imagine many of you are getting tired of hearing them.  We regret the inclusion of this unnecessary and politicised agenda item forced us to repeat them, and we look forward to the day that it will no longer waste your time, ours, or the Agency’s.

Thank you.



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This article was originally published on https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/uk-right-of-reply-on-behalf-of-aukus-partners-iaea-november-2026. It is shared here under a Creative Commons license.

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