Mr Chair,
For over half a century, the NPT has kept us safe. It has enabled the growth of a secure international civil nuclear sector while restricting the number of States possessing nuclear weapons to single figures. This is to be rightly celebrated, and we must recognise what has enabled that success, alongside looking to what should be done to ensure its work continues.
The NPT is underpinned by the tireless efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The UK remains one of the IAEA’s largest extra-budgetary contributors in support of its work on safeguards. This support has helped train IAEA inspectors, provided samples analysis to the IAEA, and supported open-source information collection. The UK will remain steadfast in our support for the Agency and will champion its independence and impartiality given its importance to international security.
In pursuing its mission, the IAEA provides expertise and confidence to its membership. The value of this is seen clearly in its verification of robust international safeguards. We encourage all states to sign and ratify the Additional Protocol, together with a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, as the universal verification standard under the NPT.
The UK supports the IAEA’s work on nuclear security. The high engagement with and participation at ICONS this year demonstrated strong global support for nuclear security. We encourage all remaining states to become party to nuclear security instruments. It was disappointing to most of us that the ICONS Ministerial Declaration was in the end not adopted and blocked by just one state. That must not distract from the vital work that is being carried out, and we fully support the co-Presidents’ statement.
We also underline the importance of the IAEA’s role in protecting nuclear security in Ukraine, where Russia’s illegal invasion and continued presence at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant threatens nuclear safety, security and safeguards.
Mr Chair,
The UK is also working to ensure developments in technology and new partnerships uphold and strengthen safeguards. We are working closely with our US and Australian partners so that Australia’s development of a nuclear-powered submarine capability sets the highest non-proliferation standard. AUKUS partners will host a side event in Geneva on 26 July to discuss our non-proliferation objectives in developing a naval nuclear propulsion programme.
Mr Chair,
While the vast majority of NPT States Parties fully comply with their safeguards obligations and uphold the integrity of the NPT, there remain serious problems that should be of concern to us all.
Iran’s nuclear programme is more advanced than ever and poses a clear threat to regional and global security. Iran’s persistent lack of cooperation with the IAEA on its legally binding safeguards obligations undermines the safeguards system and the IAEA’s authority. The UK continues to hold Iran to account. At the June IAEA Board of Governors meeting, the Board adopted a resolution condemning Iran’s failure to cooperate and reiterated its support to the IAEA’s efforts to resolve the long outstanding safeguards issues. We call on Iran to fulfil its legal obligations and clarify and resolve all outstanding issues.
The DPRK’s illegal nuclear and ballistic missile programmes remain a serious threat to international security, including the threat of a seventh nuclear test. We call on the DPRK to abandon their nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner, to return to their NPT obligations and IAEA safeguards oversight and to renew dialogue.
Mr Chair,
There are other tools that we must deploy to ensure Non-Proliferation standards are upheld. Export controls is one such tool, that facilitates the responsible exchange of civilian nuclear technology. They give states the confidence to transfer nuclear technology which supports economic growth and contributes to sustainable development while minimising proliferation risks. The UK continues to engage with the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee and urges all States to adhere to NSG’s Guidelines.
The UK also supports Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and the contribution they can make to enhance regional and international security. The UK has signed and ratified the Protocols to the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk providing legally binding negative security assurances to more than 100 countries. We stand ready to do sign and ratify the Treaty of Bangkok. The UK remains committed to a zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East, based on arrangements freely arrived at by all countries in the region.
Mr Chair,
Non-proliferation and the protection that the NPT provides is in all our security interest. Over the coming review cycle the UK stands ready to work with all States Parties to reinforce the global non-proliferation system and through its application, expand access to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
