Chair,
The United Kingdom remains committed to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons in a transparent, verifiable, and irreversible manner and with undiminished security for all. We firmly believe the best way to achieve this goal is through gradual multilateral disarmament negotiated through the NPT. The only viable, effective framework for achieving the complex technical requirements for the elimination of nuclear weapons.
The global security environment remains extremely challenging – we are working on disarmament in a more contested and volatile world. There is greater need than ever for all states to recognise these challenges, and to work together to create the environment in which we can make disarmament a reality.
As a nuclear weapon state, the UK takes its responsibilities seriously. We remain committed to working with others – including those who may threaten our interests and security – to build stability, transparency, and better mutual understanding, and to identify and implement effective measures which will ultimately shape the conditions for achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.
Chair,
The UK remains proud of our contributions to the reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons. We are the only nuclear-weapon state to reduce our deterrent capability to a single delivery system. We continue to be transparent on maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of our deterrent through our statements to Parliament, the public and in international fora.
Progress on disarmament is reflected not just through reduction in weapon numbers but also by building confidence in the disarmament process. Building collective trust and creating a suitable security environment is necessary if we want to achieve our ultimate goal.
Chair,
Notwithstanding the challenges, there are opportunities to make progress towards disarmament, through focusing our efforts on verification, irreversibility, and transparency, and building on the working papers the UK submitted, on our own and with partners, at the 2022 Review Conference. These areas remain the fundamental building blocks toward a trusted, verifiable process of disarmament.
On verification, the UK will continue our domestic research programme and international work including the QUAD Nuclear Verification Partnership with Norway, Sweden and the US and with the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification. This week, the UK will co-host a Nuclear Verification side event under the QUAD partnership giving an overview of our work, for both technical experts and policy makers alike.
We will continue our efforts on irreversibility. With Norway, we are facilitating an enhanced dialogue among States parties to build a common understanding of the conditions that would make nuclear re-armament as difficult and unlikely as possible. We will be hosting a side event later this week and aim to broaden this work with a wider range of States.
The UK will continue to focus on transparency as a priority. We publish the UK’s overall warhead stockpile limit. We issue regular updates on maintaining the safety, security and effectiveness of our deterrent through our statements to Parliament, the public and in international fora. We will continue to pursue strategic dialogues to develop greater trust, confidence, and transparency between states in relation to nuclear weapons. The UK recently published the Defence Nuclear Enterprise Command Paper, which sets out, for the first time, a full account of what it takes to deliver the UK’s nuclear deterrent. We are ready to explore integrating discussion of National Reports within the NPT cycle and we look forward to sharing a draft of our National Report ahead of the next PrepCom in 2025.
Chair,
We reiterate our long-standing positions calling for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and we urge all States that have not already done so to sign and ratify the Treaty, and particularly those listed in Annex 2. We also call for the commencement of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on an international and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.
Chair,
Let me conclude by assuring you, once again, of the UK’s continued commitment to progress on this issue throughout this Review Cycle.
Thank you.
