Thank you, Chair,
Allow me to start by putting on record the United Kingdom’s appreciation for your efforts as Chair of the 2023 Working Group on further strengthening the NPT review process. The UK was prepared to join consensus on the Chair’s recommendations in Vienna last year. We very much regret that a small handful of States blocked that consensus, and that one State blocked the subsequent proposal on interactive consideration of national reports. We stand ready to continue to engage on the basis of the Chair’s recommendations and encourage continued consultations between here and the 3rd Preparatory Committee in New York.
Mr Chair,
The UK urges States Parties to support steps to strengthen the NPT and the review process. This is an important part of ensuring the NPT is successful for the next 50 years. From effectiveness and efficiency, through transparency and accountability, to practical steps around the nominations and role of Chairs and working groups, there are several steps we can collectively take to strengthen our ability to realise the objectives of the NPT.
While Strengthening the Review Process is not limited to transparency – the last few days have illustrated once again the need for a pack of measures aimed at strengthening the review process – I will nonetheless focus my comments on this, and the related question of accountability.
Mr Chair,
In my statement under Cluster One, I noted that the United Kingdom strives for the greatest level of transparency in our nuclear doctrines, policies and capabilities consistent with our national security and non-proliferation responsibilities. Transparency in the context of nuclear disarmament has two aims: first, to increase mutual confidence among the Nuclear Weapon States and enable practical disarmament steps; and second, to provide accountability as to the implementation of Treaty obligations and other commitments and undertakings.
It is crucial for Nuclear Weapon States to be as transparent as possible about their nuclear capabilities, doctrines and policies. Transparency plays an important role in building confidence. Transparency and dialogue are necessary to prevent or reduce risks of miscalculation and misperception, and thus strengthen stability and reduce risk of unintended nuclear use. As we made clear in our national statement in the General Debate, we remain committed to the P5 nuclear process.
The UK regrets that some Nuclear Weapons States do not publish details of their overall warhead stockpiles or on the delivery systems they deploy. In not doing so, these states are undermining trust and confidence in the NPT process, particularly when states are expanding their capabilities rapidly, at scale and across multiple delivery systems.
Mr Chair,
This brings me to the question of accountability. States must be held accountable for the implementation of the obligations under Treaties they have signed up to and other commitments they have entered into.
One of the primary means of accountability for the UK is its National Implementation Reports. In preparing our report for the last NPT RevCon, the UK conducted an extensive consultation exercise involving the other nuclear-weapon States, nonnuclear weapon States and civil society. The report is a comprehensive statement of the UK’s national measures on disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
Mr Chair,
The UK will continue to prioritise the question of improving transparency and accountability in the current NPT review cycle. While Action 20 of the 2010 Action Plan asks all States Parties to submit national implementation reports, it is right, building on Actions 5 and 21, that the Nuclear Weapon States should take steps to improve the quality and consistency of reporting on our specific nuclear disarmament commitments.
We continue to support the idea of allocating dedicated time in the formal proceedings of the review cycle for the interactive consideration of the reports of States Parties.
As in past review cycles, the UK intends to submit its draft National Implementation Report at the third session of the Preparatory Committee in New York next year, using the common reporting framework agreed upon by the Nuclear Weapon States in 2013. We would once again welcome discussion and feedback from other States Parties and from civil society in order to ensure the final report to the Review Conference in 2026 is as useful as possible to its readers.
Thank you.
