When someone is placed on location monitoring for one purpose, it does not justify law enforcement’s access to that information for a completely different purpose without a proper warrant.
EFF joined the Committee for Public Counsel Services, ACLU, ACLU of Massachusetts, and the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, in filing an amicus brief in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Commonwealth v. Govan, arguing just that.
In this case, the defendant Anthony Govan was subjected to pretrial electronic monitoring as a condition of release prior to trial. In investigating a completely unrelated crime, the police asked the pretrial electronic monitoring division for the identity and location of “anyone” who was near the location of this latter incident. Mr. Govan’s data was part of the response, and that information was used against him in this unrelated case.
Our joint amicus brief highlighted the coercive nature of electronic monitoring programs. When the alternative is being locked up, there is no meaningful consent to the collection of information under electronic monitoring. At the same time, as someone on pretrial release, Mr. Govan had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his location information. As courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, have recognized, location and movement information are incredibly sensitive and revealing. Just because someone is on electronic monitoring, it doesn’t mean they have no expectation of privacy, whether they are going to a political protest, a prayer group, an abortion clinic, a gun show, or their private home. Pretrial electronic monitoring collects this information around the clock—information that otherwise would not have been available to law enforcement through traditional tools.
The violation of privacy is especially problematic in this case, because Mr. Govan had not been convicted and is still presumed to be innocent. According to current law, those on pretrial release are entitled to far stronger Fourth Amendment protections than those who are on monitored release after a conviction. As argued in the amicus brief, absent a proper warrant, the information gathered by the electronic monitoring program should only be used to make sure Mr. Govan was complying with his pretrial release conditions.
Lastly, although this case is decided on the absence of a warrant or a warrant exception, we argued that the court should provide guidance for future warrants. The Fourth Amendment and its state corollaries prohibit “general warrants,” akin to a fishing expedition, and instead require warrants meet nexus and particularity requirements. Bulk location data requests like the one in this case cannot meet that standard.
While electronic monitoring is marketed as an alternative to detention, the evidence does not bear this out. Courts should not allow the government to use the information gathered from this expansion of state surveillance to be used beyond its purpose without a warrant.
