Thank you, President.
I have the honour of speaking on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
President,
I refer colleagues to the General Conference document 68/19 circulated on 11 September which reiterated our concerns regarding the addition of this political agenda item by one Member State. Australia, the United Kingdom and United States do not support the inclusion of this agenda item. We understand from our extensive consultations that the majority of IAEA Member States are of a similar view.
Under this agenda item, both here and at the Board of Governors, we continue to hear statements casting doubt on the Agency’s mandate and the established legal framework – statements targeted specifically at the Agency’s bilateral engagement with Australia. While the tone has varied, the substance has remained the same. Attempts have been made to call into question the Secretariat’s technical mandate, the established legal framework, and the Director General’s clear statements on the topic. This is regrettable.
President,
We recognise that there are genuine questions among Member States regarding naval nuclear propulsion in Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement states. That is why we have engaged in good faith with all Member States, consistent with our commitment to openness and transparency. In this regard, Australia provided an update through its national statement on our program to acquire naval nuclear propulsion technology at this Conference during the General Debate – as we did last year and the year before that. We have also provided updates at each regular Board meeting since the AUKUS partnership was first announced in September 2021.
As AUKUS partners have previously said, Australia is working with the IAEA to develop a safeguards and verification approach for its program that sets the highest non‑proliferation standard, including an Article 14 arrangement under Australia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. This will not involve a template, or a prescriptive ‘one size fits all’ approach. Given state specific variations between naval nuclear propulsion programs, such an approach would not be effective. We are committed to an approach that will enable the Agency to meet its technical safeguards objectives for Australia at all times. This is important technical work that is entirely within the Agency’s mandate – as the Director General has confirmed.
It will clearly take time to develop this approach, and detailed technical discussions in the Board would be premature at this stage. But the Director General has been clear that, in due course, the Article 14 arrangement will come to the Board of Governors for appropriate action, and we fully support this approach. At that time, we expect, and intend, for the Board to consider it on its non-proliferation merits.
President,
I regret that we have heard disinformation from one country about the AUKUS Agreement for Cooperation Related to Naval Nuclear Propulsion, which was signed by our three countries on 5 August 2024 and has subsequently been submitted to our respective legislatures for consideration. The Agreement reaffirms the AUKUS partners’ respective non-proliferation obligations, including under the NPT and Australia’s obligations under the Treaty of Rarotonga, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, and its CSA and Additional Protocol. It obliges the parties to ensure that Australia can provide the Agency with information and access necessary to fulfil Australia’s safeguards obligations to the IAEA, while also ensuring protection of sensitive information. Importantly, under the Agreement the US and the UK cannot transfer any nuclear material to Australia for use in naval nuclear propulsion prior to Australia having an Article 14 arrangement in place with the IAEA.
Our time here is valuable and so this is not the appropriate forum to rebut all the disinformation we have heard point by point. I instead refer delegations to the Agreement’s publicly available text, the statement made by the Director General on 15 August which notes the key non-proliferation relevant features of the Agreement, and to the AUKUS update I provided to the Board of Governors last week under Any Other Business.
President,
The Director General has made it clear that he will continue to keep Member States informed on developments in his engagement on naval nuclear propulsion programs. He did so in June 2023, in reports to the Board of Governors on the two countries with naval nuclear propulsion programs currently underway. He also did so in the Safeguards Implementation Report for 2023. And he has made clear he will provide further reporting, when appropriate.
As AUKUS partners have made clear, we welcome the Director General’s reporting on Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion program and will continue to support the Director General’s judgement as to when to report on naval nuclear propulsion programs. Technically focussed discussions on such programs in the Board, under agenda items proposed by the Director General and guided by his assessments, accord with the Agency’s character as a technical organisation. It is this approach that will uphold the Agency’s independent, impartial and technical role in safeguards implementation. This is of great importance to every Member State, and something we should all strive to protect.
President,
Once again, I would like to express our regret for needing to intervene at this point, under this agenda item. But it is important that we express our views for the record.
Thank you, President.
