The second Trump administration has seen an aggressive restoration of “big stick” foreign policy. In just two months, Trump has already sparked trade wars with Canada, Mexico and the EU, threatened to annex Greenland and pull the US out of NATO, opened negotiations with Russia to reach a cease-fire in Ukraine, and suspended military aid to Kyiv.
Understandably, this posture is cause for alarm across European states, who have now made continent-wide rearmament a top priority. On 4th March the European Commission launched the ReArm Europe Plan, a revolutionary package of measures that aims to boost EU defence spending by €800 billion over a period of four years.
On March 14 Germany’s conservative Chancellor-in-waiting, Friedrich Merz, also secured support to reform the country’s constitutional debt brake, paving the way for a breakthrough spending plan of up to €1 trillion in defence and infrastructure projects. “Germany is back”, he declared, in a moment that marked the end of over two decades of strict fiscal conservatism.
While decisive moves are being made across the continent, Europe’s policymakers and public opinion alike seem to have been caught by surprise. Public debate is largely being driven by emotional considerations, and policy decisions are dominated by short-term thinking and a lack of strategic planning.
With much of the media’s attention focused on purchasing arms and munitions, several crucial elements are missing from the discussion on strengthening Europe’s defence. We can categorise these into three key areas.
1. Massive military recruitment
EU member states, as well as Nato allies other than the US, will have to increase their manpower by recruiting massive numbers of new soldiers to offset a declining US military presence in, and commitment towards, Europe.
But how many troops does Europe need to protect itself, defend Ukraine, and deter further Russian aggression? A recent report says somewhere between 200,000 and 300,000 – roughly the same size of the new Nato Force Model approved at the 2022 Nato Summit in Madrid.
There is also the intensely complex question of where these new troops will come from. Converting smaller national armies into a larger combat force is anything but easy, especially in political and social terms. Certain fundamental quandaries will have to be addressed, such as who a European defence force would ultimately answer to, or what would happen if a European defence decision clashed with domestic politics.
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2. France’s nuclear umbrella
European states will have to invest in nuclear, as well as conventional, deterrence. French President Emmanuel Macron has recently suggested extending France’s nuclear umbrella to cover its EU partners. However, doubts remain about whether the existing “force de frappe” is enough to protect against Russia’s far larger arsenal.
By the same token, the UK is reconsidering the role of its Trident submarine-launched nuclear missiles, though it is an outdated system, and very much dependant on the US.
Disagreements on nuclear force are already becoming clear – Poland’s President, Andrzej Duda, recently called for the US to station nuclear weapons on Polish soil. This may sound reasonable, since Warsaw is Nato’s largest military spender in relation to GDP, but outsourcing Europe’s defence to Washington undermines the fundamental goal of rearming Europe.
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3. International coordination
Logistics and procurement present a huge obstacle. On March 18, the EU Commission presented the brand new “White Paper on the Future of European Defence”. This is a set of guidelines on how to boost production and military readiness, and develop a true European single market for defence in a number of key capability projects through collaborative procurement and large-scale pan-European defence projects.
Under the current circumstances, raising efficiency and avoiding pointless duplication is crucial. According to EUISS expert Giuseppe Spatafora, “the EU should propose to use the new funding instruments to develop European-wide enablers that are necessary to deter or successfully fight Russia without the US”. This refers to, among other things, battlefield command and control (C2), long-range strikes and suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), and intelligence systems.
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Risks and roadblocks
For EU member states – along with like-minded partners such as Canada, Norway, Turkey, and the UK – rearmament cannot be delayed any longer. The unsettling revisionism of the Trump administration is an existential wake-up call for Europe to progress towards a much more integrated Union. This requires deliberation, vision, and leadership. Opportunities always come with risks, and these can, again, be grouped into three categories.
The first is public support for rearmament. While many polls show that Europeans are increasingly in favour of becoming more autonomous from the US, this conflicts with their views on the instruments, costs and aims of a more independent European defence.
These are some of the conclusions of the Next Generation Security report, led by myself and recently published by IE University. When it comes to defence, younger generations in Western Europe are characterised by a lack of information, clashing priorities, and a general reluctance to pay the greater costs of sustaining a European army.
Serving in the army, or picking up arms in the case of a future armed conflict, doesn’t seem to be an option at all for most members of Generation Z.
The second risk is related to Europe’s persistently fragmented defence industry. Over 70% of defence acquisitions by EU member states between February 2022 and June 2023 were made from outside the EU, chiefly from the US.
Europe cannot switch off its dependencies on the US straightaway, but it can take smart measures to minimise its lack of strategic autonomy. Specifically, it needs to encourage a higher level of investment, and more private-public joint ventures and co-productions in the industry and technology.
The third risk is the lack of a coherent strategic framework for managing Europe’s rearmament. As things currently stand there are two possible options: a strengthened European pillar inside Nato, or a Nato caucus (without the US) connected to the EU. Right now, it is unclear which formula would work best.
However, what is clear is that ReArm Europe leaves EU member states a substantial degree of power to decide on the format, purpose, and size of their rearmament. While such a provision may alleviate concerns in some national governments about over-centralisation from the EU Commission, it runs the risk of continuing the “do-it-your-own-way” attitude of European defence. This may hamper its efficiency, and frustrate expectations.
